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Perceptual decision making is a computationally demanding process that requires the brain to interpret
incoming sensory information in the context of goals, expectations, preferences, and other factors. These
integrative processes engage much of cortex but also require contributions from subcortical structures to
affect behavior. Here we summarize recent evidence supporting specific computational roles of the basal
ganglia in perceptual decisionmaking. These roles probably share commonmechanisms with the basal gan-
glia’s other, more well-established functions in motor control, learning, and other aspects of cognition and
thus can provide insights into the general roles of this important subcortical network in higher brain function.Introduction
For over three centuries, scholars have debated the basal gan-
glia’s contributions to perception. Extensive projections to the
basal ganglia from nearly all parts of the cerebral cortex led early
neuroscientists to suggest that these subcortical structures are
‘‘the seat of the ‘sensorium commune’’’ (Thomas Willis, 1667,
as cited in Wilson, 1914) and that ‘‘the royal road of the sensa-
tions of the body to the soul is through the corpora striata [the
primary input to the basal ganglia] and all determinations of the
will also descend by that road’’ (Emanuel Swedenborg, 1740,
as cited in Wilson, 1914). However, this focus on sensation
was overshadowed by discoveries that disturbances in the basal
ganglia cause muscle contraction and movement disorders,
leading to extensive studies of their roles in the selection, initia-
tion, and execution of voluntary movements (Denny-Brown,
1962; Ferrier, 1873; Wilson, 1914). This work, in turn, has pro-
vided a framework for recent re-examinations of the basal gan-
glia’s contributions to nonmotor functions (reviewed in Brown
et al., 1997). For example, it has been suggested that the parallel
anatomical loops within the basal ganglia pathway provide a
‘‘centralized selection mechanism’’ that resolves conflicts at
multiple levels and in different domains, thus allowing the basal
ganglia to ‘‘play a comparable role in cognition to that of action
selection in motor control’’ (Redgrave et al., 1999). In this
Perspective, we tie these ideas about the basal ganglia’s role
in motor control and cognition back to perception, summarizing
recent work that implicates this subcortical circuit in specific
computations used to form perceptual decisions.
Perceptual decisions are categorical judgments about the
presence or identity of sensory stimuli. Examples include deter-
mining whether or not a car is approaching, identifying a face in a
crowd, or detecting a faint cry for help. These kinds of decisions
are not reflexive responses to sensory input but rather delibera-
tive processes that combine the available sensory evidence with
information related to the known alternatives, past experiences,
goals, and other factors to reach a categorical judgment that can
guide behavior. These deliberative processes contribute to all640 Neuron 79, August 21, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.measurable aspects of perception, from sensitivity to low-level
features of sensory input to the ability to parse complex scenes
(Gold and Ding, 2013; Parker and Newsome, 1998). The under-
lying neural mechanisms include contributions from many parts
of the cerebral cortex, particularly integrative areas in the parietal
and prefrontal cortices (Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Heekeren et al.,
2008). However, the complex computations needed to imple-
ment these processes and use them to guide behavior are not
solely a cortical phenomenon.
Here we synthesize from recent electrophysiological, imaging,
and computational studies a summary of our current under-
standing of the basal ganglia’s contributions to the computations
that are responsible for perceptual decisions. The Perspective
is organized as follows. First, we provide some background
on mechanisms of perceptual decision making in the brain,
focusing on experimental paradigms that have allowed re-
searchers to identify neural signatures of key computations of
the decision process. We then briefly describe the basal ganglia
circuitry that we will subsequently relate to perceptual decision
making. We then review recent evidence that supports possible
roles for this circuitry in three types of decision-related computa-
tions. We close with a discussion of open questions related
to the role of the basal ganglia in perceptual decision making.
Computational and Neural Substrates of Perceptual
Decision Making
Psychophysical techniques developed over the past 150 years
have provided the tools needed to examine quantitatively how
the brain converts noisy sensory input into a categorical choice.
An important advance in these techniques was the incorporation
of principles of Signal Detection Theory, which established the
usefulness of analyzing perceptual decisions in terms of compu-
tationally separable processes (Green and Swets, 1966; Macmil-
lan and Creelman, 2004). These processes include formation of
the decision variable, which is a scalar quantity representing all
available evidence (including signal and noise) used to form the
decision, and application of the decision rule, which converts
Evidence
Decision
Variable
Time
Bound for choice 1
Bound for choice 2
Accumulation
Starting value
Bound
crossing
Figure 1. Drift-Diffusion Model
Noisy sensory evidence (top; independent, identically distributed picks from
the Gaussian distribution at the right) is accumulated in time to form a decision
variable (bottom). Note the slightly positive mean value of the distribution of
evidence, which governs the upward rate of rise of the decision variable. When
the decision variable hits one of the choice bounds, this choice is made.
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of this theory, representing a form of statistical decision theory
known as sequential analysis, further characterized formation
of the decision variable as a temporally dynamic process that
takes advantage of incoming streams of sensory data to balance
the speed and accuracy of the decision process (Bogacz et al.,
2006; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Link and Heath, 1975; Ratcliff
and Smith, 2004). Critically, these computational frameworks
have provided not only a description of decision outcomes under
certain conditions, but also insights into the underlying neural
mechanisms.
These principles have been applied extensively to a task that
involves a decision about the global motion direction of a field
of moving, randomly positioned dots on a computer screen
(the ‘‘dots task’’; Britten et al., 1992; Morgan and Ward, 1980).
For this task, experimenters can precisely control the difficulty
of the decision by changing the percentage of coherently moving
dots (coherence). On high-coherence trials, the majority of dots
move in the same direction, making it easy to decide the correct
global motion direction. On low-coherence trials, only a small
percentage of dots move in the same direction, while the other
dots move randomly, making the direction decision more diffi-
cult. Both human andmonkey subjects can be trained to perform
with high accuracy even for low-coherence stimuli. Performance
also depends critically on viewing duration, with increasing
accuracy for longer viewing durations, particularly for low-
coherence stimuli. Accordingly, when a subject is instructed to
respond as soon as the decision is formed, as in response
time (RT) versions of the task, responding quickly yields lower
accuracy, whereas taking longer to respond corresponds to
higher-accuracy decisions (Palmer et al., 2005; Roitman and
Shadlen, 2002).
Successful models of this decision process typically assume
that the sensory evidence, which fluctuates noisily from
moment-to-moment relative to a constant average value on agiven trial, is integrated over time (Figure 1; Mazurek et al.,
2003). This form of sequential analysis increases the signal-to-
noise ratio of the decision variable as a function of viewing
time. For the RT task, many models further assume a decision
rule in the form of a pair of stopping bounds or thresholds:
when the accumulating evidence reaches one of these prede-
fined values (often corresponding to a positive value for one
choice, a negative value of equal magnitude for the alternative),
the process stops. The identity of the reached bound determines
the choice; the time of bound crossing determines the RT.
Adjusting the bound governs the speed-accuracy tradeoff: a
higher bound provides higher accuracy but longer RTs, whereas
a lower bound provides lower accuracy and shorter RTs. This
process can be modeled using the mathematical description
of the position of a subatomic particle undergoing Brownian
motion, which corresponds to the noisy, accumulating decision
variable. This drift diffusionmodel (DDM) can effectively describe
psychometric (accuracy versus motion coherence) and chrono-
metric (RT versus motion coherence) performance data (Palmer
et al., 2005; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff and Rouder,
1998).
The computations described by the DDM have been identified
in several brain regions (see review by Gold and Shadlen, 2007).
The sensory evidence for this task is represented, at least in part,
in the middle temporal (MT) and medial superior temporal (MST)
areas of extrastriate visual cortex (Britten et al., 1992, 1993,
1996; Celebrini and Newsome, 1994, 1995). Neurons in these
brain regions respond selectively to visual stimuli moving in
particular directions and thus provide a moment-by-moment
representation of the dot stimulus. Electrical microstimulation
of MT sites affects both choice and RT and the combined effects
are consistent with MT neurons providing momentary evidence
to an accumulator (Ditterich et al., 2003; Hanks et al., 2006; Salz-
man et al., 1990). The temporal accumulation of momentary
evidence is reflected in the activity of certain neurons outside
the primary visual areas, including in the lateral intraparietal
area (LIP) of parietal cortex (Shadlen and Newsome, 1996).
Unlike MT neurons, these LIP neurons have activity that builds
up (or down) during the decision process, with coherence and
time dependence consistent with a decision variable in the
DDM. For an RT version of the task, this activity appears to reach
a predefined value just prior to the decision, as prescribed by the
DDM (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002). LIP is not alone, however, in
representing a DDM-like decision process for this task. Similar
activity and/or causal relationship with visual perceptual deci-
sions have been found in several other brain regions that are
strongly interconnected with LIP, including the frontal eye field
(FEF) and other parts of prefrontal cortex and the superior colli-
culus (Ding and Gold, 2012a; Ferrera et al., 2009; Horwitz and
Newsome, 1999; Kim and Shadlen, 1999; Krauzlis, 2004; Love-
joy and Krauzlis, 2010; Ratcliff et al., 2003, 2007).
The involvement of multiple brain regions in the oculomotor
network reflects the behavioral context in which these percep-
tual decisions were studied (but may also be more general; see
Bennur and Gold, 2011; Freedman and Assad, 2006; Rishel
et al., 2013). Specifically, the monkeys were trained to indicate
their direction decisions with saccadic eye movements to visual
targets located along the axis of coherent motion. Under theseNeuron 79, August 21, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 641
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Figure 2. A Simplified Basal Ganglia Circuit
The dashed black line represents feedback pathways. Abbreviations: FEF,
frontal eye field; GPi and GPe, the internal and external segments of the globus
pallidus; LIP, lateral intraparietal area of the parietal cortex; SC, superior
colliculus; SNc, substantia nigra pars compacta; SNr, substantia nigra pars
reticulata; STN, subthalamic nucleus; VTA, ventral tegmental area.
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a form of saccadic selection, representing a form of ‘‘embodied
cognition’’ in which higher brain functions like perceptual
decision making are implemented directly in the service of
behavioral planning and control (Gibson, 1966). According to
this view, other oculomotor brain regions may also participate
in saccade-linked perceptual decisions.
The basal ganglia are well positioned functionally and anatom-
ically to contribute to saccade-linked decisions (Figure 2). The
caudate nucleus is the primary oculomotor component of the
striatum, with signals related to the preparation and execution
of saccadic eye movements (Hikosaka et al., 2000). It receives
inputs from both FEF and LIP. Its output is split along direct
and indirect pathways, which are thought to have facilitatory
and inhibitory effects, respectively, on behavior (Albin et al.,
1989; Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; DeLong, 1990; Kravitz
et al., 2010; Smith et al., 1998). These pathways converge in
the substantia nigra, pars reticulata (SNr), which sends the
output of the oculomotor basal ganglia to the superior colliculus
and, via the thalamus, back up to cortex. Thus, the basal ganglia
carry oculomotor-related signals and are intricately intercon-
nected with other brain areas that are implicated strongly in
perceptual decisions that instruct saccadic eye movements.
This oculomotor basal ganglia circuit has long been thought to
play primarily a permissive role in the generation of saccadic eye
movements. Tonic inhibition from the SNr to the superior collicu-
lus is briefly released around the time that a saccade plan is642 Neuron 79, August 21, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.activated, allowing for enough excitatory drive to activate the
brainstem saccade generators and thus initiate the movement
(Hikosaka and Wurtz, 1983d). In addition, this and other basal
ganglia circuits are thought to be important loci for reinforce-
ment-based motor control, which on relatively long timescales
helps to optimize policies for action selection tomaximize oppor-
tunities to obtain benefits and avoid costs when interacting with
the world (Barto, 1995; Hikosaka et al., 2006; Houk et al., 1995;
Redgrave et al., 1999; Shadmehr and Krakauer, 2008; Turner
and Desmurget, 2010).
Below we review current evidence that these motor-related
functions of the basal ganglia can also play specific roles in the
interpretation of sensory input. These roles are probably imple-
mented in the service of helping to select impending or delayed
movements and thus can be thought of in an ‘‘embodied’’ frame-
work. Within this framework, the basal ganglia appear to provide
specific computations to help form perceptual decision vari-
ables, implement decision rules, and evaluate and modify the
decision process via learning.
Formation of the Decision Variable
Given the connectivity of the oculomotor circuit and the pres-
ence of DDM-like decision signals in certain neurons in LIP,
FEF, and the superior colliculus, an obvious question is whether
or not these signals are sent through the basal ganglia pathway,
and if so, what, if any, functional role they play in the decision
process. To answer these questions, we recently targeted the
oculomotor caudate with neuronal recordings, electrical micro-
stimulation, and computational modeling. In short, we found
that caudate neurons can represent and causally contribute to
the accumulating decision variable used to make the final
saccadic choice.
Figure 3 compares the decision variable predicted by the DDM
and neural activity we measured in the caudate and FEF of mon-
keys performing an RT version of the dots task. Figures 3A and
3B show simulated trials that terminated with a choice associ-
ated with the upper bound. After stimulus onset, the decision
variable rises in a manner that depends on stimulus strength
and then terminates upon reaching the upper bound. For the
alternative choice, the decision variable follows downward tra-
jectories until reaching the lower bound (data not shown).
Caudate activity shows a similar dependence onmotion strength
and viewing time, at least relatively early in the decision process
(Ding and Gold, 2010; Figure 3C). After motion onset, there is a
brief delay as the relevant visual signals propagate from the
retina to the basal ganglia. Subsequently, there is a motion
strength-dependent rise in responses on trials that ultimately
results in a saccadic eye movement to the target located in
each neuron’s spatial response field. This rise in activity is
similar, albeit slightly weaker, on error trials (see Ding and
Gold, 2010). This pattern of activity is consistent with a DDM-
like decision variable that represents not the sensory evidence
itself but rather the interpretation of that evidence to arrive at
the final choice, similar to LIP, FEF, and the superior colliculus
(example FEF activity is shown in Figure 3E).
In contrast, caudate activity that occurs later in the decision
process does not match predictions of the DDM. In the DDM,
the decision process ends when the accumulating decision
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Figure 3. Decision Formation
(A and B) Simulated data illustrating the average decision variable trajectories
in a DDM for different input strengths, aligned to the beginning (A) or end (B) of
the accumulation process. Colors indicate coherence levels.
(C and D) Average activity of a subset of caudate neurons recorded inmonkeys
performing the dots task, aligned to stimulus (C) and saccade (D) onset,
respectively. IN, choices toward the recorded neuron’s response field (RF).
OUT, choices away from the RF. Colors indicate data from trials with different
motion coherences. Note the choice- and coherence-dependent modulation
of caudate activity during motion viewing and the lack of a final ‘‘bound-like’’
pattern of activity level around saccade time. Modified from Ding and Gold
(2010).
(E and F) Average activity of a subset of FEF neurons recorded in monkeys
performing the dots task, aligned to stimulus (E) and saccade (F) onset,
respectively. Modified from Ding and Gold (2012a).
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Perspectivevariable reaches a fixed bound. Accordingly, when the decision
variable is aligned in time to the end of the decision process, all of
the curves should converge at a common level, regardless of
their rate of rise (Figure 3B). Certain FEF and LIP neurons show
this behavior (Figure 3F; Ding and Gold, 2012a; Roitman and
Shadlen, 2002). However, caudate activity does not (Ding and
Gold, 2010; Figure 3D). Instead of converging to a peak level of
activity that immediately precedes saccades, average caudate
responses converge on a value that is lower than the peak activ-
ity achieved duringmotion viewing. Together, these results imply
that the caudate’s contributions to the formation of the decision
variable might be limited to early in the decision process.These contributions can causally affect the outcome of the
ongoing decision process. To establish this causal role, we
used electrical microstimulation in the caudate to bias both the
choices and RTs of monkeys performing the dots task (Ding
and Gold, 2012b). In relation to the DDM, these effects had
two distinguishable components. One component reflected
a bias in nonperceptual processes, such that nondecision
times (i.e., the components of the monkey’s RT that were not
accounted for by the DDM-like decision process, probably
including basic sensory and motor processing) increased for
ipsilateral choices and decreased for contralateral choices.
This result is consistent with the basal ganglia’s known role in
facilitating saccadic eye movements to contralateral targets.
The second component included a decrease/increase in the
total amount of accumulated evidence required for ipsilateral/
contralateral choices. This component can be interpreted as
a caudate-mediated offset in the value of the decision variable
in the DDM and was similar to results from LIP microstimulation,
albeit opposite in sign (LIP microstimulation tended to cause a
bias toward contralateral choices; Hanks et al., 2006).
Neural activity reminiscent of an offset in the initial value of the
decision variable was also observed in a small subpopulation of
caudate neurons (Ding and Gold, 2010). This type of activity
emerges early, well before motion onset. As illustrated in
Figure 4A, a positive starting value reduces the total amount of
evidence required for the choice with positive decision bound,
thus making it more likely for the decision variable to cross that
bound and creating a choice bias. This biasing effect is more
profound when stimulus strength is low. In other words, on
more difficult trials, in which low-coherence motion stimuli do
not provide much evidence for either choice, the relative magni-
tude of the starting value is more predictive of the monkey’s
subsequent saccadic choice. On easier trials, the effect of the
starting value is drowned out by strong evidence and the starting
value is not predictive of choice. Figure 4B shows an example of
a caudate neuron that encoded this kind of process.
The starting value-related signal appears similar to a reward
bias-related signal that has been identified in the caudate
nucleus. In one notable study, monkeys were trained to make
a saccadic eye movement to a target flashed at one of two
possible locations (Lauwereyns et al., 2002). Critically, one of
the locations was paired with water reward and the other was
not rewarded. Behaviorally, the monkeys tended to have shorter
RTs when instructed to make a saccadic eye movement to
foveate the rewarded target. These reward-driven biases in RT
were correlated with the magnitude of neuronal activation of
oculomotor caudate neurons before target presentation. One
parsimonious explanation for these results is that the basal
gangliamodulates the initial value and development of a decision
variable based on reward expectation and other factors, ulti-
mately biasing not just movement execution but also movement
selection.
These results are supported by several recent fMRI studies.
When prior probability or reward association is unequal for the
two motion directions, human subjects’ behavior is biased
toward the choice associated with higher prior probability or
larger reward (Feng et al., 2009; Forstmann et al., 2010; Mulder
et al., 2012; Nagano-Saito et al., 2012; Voss et al., 2004). ThisNeuron 79, August 21, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 643
Low coherenceA
P
re
di
ct
iv
e 
in
de
x
Time (ms)
-400 STIM 400 800 1200
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
3.2
51.2
B
High coherence
Time
D
ec
is
io
n 
V
ar
ia
bl
e
0 20 40 60
0.5
0.6
%Coherence
Figure 4. Initial Bias Signals
(A) Simulated data illustrating the effects of a nonzero starting value on a DDM-
based decision process. Gray lines show trajectories of a decision variable in
15 simulated trials with low-coherence (left) and high-coherence (right) inputs
and using either a zero (top) or slightly positive (bottom) starting value. Note the
stronger effects of the initial bias on the final choices for the low- versus high-
coherence simulations.
(B) Coherence-dependent predictive index of prestimulus activity in a caudate
neuron. The predictive index quantifies the correlation between neuronal
activity and subsequent behavioral choices. A higher value indicates that the
activity is more predictive of the final choice. Colors indicate motion coher-
ence. The right panel shows the mean predictive index from the shaded time
window in the left panel, plotted as a function of motion coherence. Modified
from Ding and Gold (2010).
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process and is encoded in parts of the striatum (Forstmann
et al., 2010; Nagano-Saito et al., 2012). Collectively, these exper-
imental results suggest that the basal ganglia can incorporate
expectations about sensory stimuli and reward outcomes to
bias the value of a developing decision variable.
An evenmore expansive role for the basal ganglia in the forma-
tion of decision variables has been proposed by a recent theoret-
ical study. Bogacz and Gurney (2007) suggested that the basal
ganglia network may implement a multihypothesis sequential
probability ratio test (MSPRT) for perceptual decision making.
The MSPRT estimates the conditional probabilities of the multi-
ple hypotheses being true given sensory stimuli and commits
to decision i if the logarithm of the corresponding conditional
probability (Li, which can take different forms including log-likeli-
hood, log-likelihood ratios, or log-odds; Lepora and Gurney,
2012) reaches a predefined threshold. Li is proportional to a
time integral of sensory evidence for one choice and normalized
across all alternative choices. According to this model, the direct
pathway, in which the striatum projects directly to the pallidal
output neurons in GPi, relays the unnormalized values of these644 Neuron 79, August 21, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.probabilities. The indirect pathway, in which cortical inputs are
further processed in the interconnected STN-GPe circuits,
gathers information related to all alternatives and provides the
(possibly modifiable) normalization quantity through the STN-
GPi projection. The output of the basal ganglia thus reflects Li,
upon which a threshold may be applied to generate a decision.
This intriguing idea awaits experimental testing.
Implementation of the Decision Rule
Asnoted above, a key feature of signal detection theory is that the
decision variable and thedecision rule aredistinct components of
the decision process, with identifiably different consequences on
behavior (Green and Swets, 1966; Macmillan and Creelman,
2004). Given the dominant view of basal ganglia function in terms
of action selection, it is natural to consider its role in implementing
the final rule, or selection process, of a winner-take-all deci-
sion between multiple alternatives (Berns and Sejnowski, 1995;
Mink, 1996; Redgrave et al., 1999; Wickens, 1993). A possible
scheme that is consistent with the basal ganglia’s known roles
in action selection is as follows. Different cortex-striatum ensem-
bles form separate processing units that link inputs to actions. A
specific input pattern leads to activation of the corresponding
pallidal neurons, which subsequently disinhibit downstream thal-
amus/colliculus areas and enables the corresponding action.
Activation of the same cortex-striatum ensemble also disinhibits
subthalamic neurons via the GPe, which provides delayed and
diffuse activation of pallidal projection neurons, such that all other
actions are suppressed. In principle, if the specific input pattern
represents the prediction of a preferred outcome, this scheme
can support value-based decisions. Conversely, if the specific
input pattern represents certain properties of sensory stimuli,
this scheme can support perceptual decisions.
If such a scheme is implemented in the basal ganglia, one
might expect to observe correlates of a DDM-like bound
crossing at the end of the decision process, representing a
commitment to one of the two possible outcomes. As noted
above, in monkeys performing an RT version of the dots task,
this kind of activity is observed in LIP and FEF but not in the
caudate (Figure 3). One interpretation of this difference between
caudate and LIP/FEF activity at the time of decision commitment
is that the basal ganglia are only involved in the early part of the
decision process. Alternatively, bound crossing may occur
downstream from the caudate in the basal ganglia pathway
and then get sent back up to cortex. These ideas have not yet
been tested directly.
Despite the questions about if and how the basal ganglia might
implement the decision rule, several lines of evidence suggest
that they can at least help to adaptively modulate its implemen-
tation. For example, changing task demands can cause human
subjects to adjust their speed-accuracy tradeoffs on an RT
version of the dots task. These adjustments correspond to reli-
able changes in activation of the anterior striatum measured
using fMRI (Forstmann et al., 2008, 2010). Using a linear ballistic
accumulation model—one variant of the accumulation-to-bound
models—to relate fMRI signals to behavior, the between-condi-
tion difference of striatal activation was shown to correlate with
the difference in the estimated bound height, but not drift rate,
of the model fit to behavior.
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motivated model of the cortex-basal ganglia-superior colliculus
network (Lo and Wang, 2006). The model contains a recurrent
cortical network that generates buildup activity similar to that
observed in LIP and FEF, a recurrent superior colliculus network
that produces burst of activity for saccade generation and resets
the cortical network through feedback connections, and a basal
ganglia network that connects the cortical and collicular net-
works through only the direct pathway. With biophysical param-
eters consistent with experimental observations, the model
detects threshold crossing of the ramping cortical activity
through the cortex-colliculus pathway. However, the fine-tuning
of the effective threshold value can be done more efficiently with
changes in the corticostriatal projection than with changes in the
corticocollicular projection. Thus, within the context of this
model, the basal ganglia may playmodulatory roles in the adjust-
ment of the decision bound, even if the decision rule is not imple-
mented there.
A modulatory role of the basal ganglia is also supported by a
study of the subthalamic nucleus in an impulse-control behav-
ioral paradigm (Cavanagh et al., 2011). Although not a perceptual
task, the impulse-control behavior in the study can also be
described by a DDM, with the decision bound influencing the
propensity for impulsive choices. The decision bound is corre-
lated with theta-power signals in the medial prefrontal cortex
and lower-frequency local field potential in the subthalamic
nucleus. Both the decision bound and the prefrontal signals
can be altered with deep brain stimulation in the subthalamic
nucleus. Combined with the striatal results detailed above, it
seems that multiple nuclei in the basal ganglia can influence
how a decision bound is set, suggesting an important role for
the basal ganglia in modifying the decision rule.
Evaluation and Learning
Since the discovery of reward prediction error signals in the
dopaminergic neurons, reinforcement learning—especially the
so-called temporal-difference learning processes—has been
linked with basal ganglia functions (Barto, 1995; Houk et al.,
1995; Schultz, 1998). These learning processes, such as
Q-learning or actor-criticmethods,makedecisions using amodi-
fiable policy that operates on estimates of the values of alterna-
tive actions and/or estimates of current states (Sutton and Barto,
1998). Action/state values are estimated based on current sen-
sory input, past reinforcement history, and knowledge of the
decision policy. With repeated trial-and-error, these methods
improve both decision policy and estimates of action/state
values, allowing the decision maker to adapt to current task
demand for better performance; i.e., more overall reinforcement.
In temporal-difference learning, action value is updated based
on the error between its actual and predicted values, called the
reward prediction error. Dopaminergic neurons, which provide
strong modulatory input to the striatum and elsewhere, are a
classic example of a neural representation of the reward predic-
tion error (Schultz, 1998, 2002). When a reward is unexpected,
these neurons respond with phasic activation to reward delivery.
When the reward can be fully predicted by a sensory cue, these
neurons respond with phasic activation to the cue, but no longer
to the reward itself. When expected reward does not arrive,these neurons respond with suppression of activity at the ex-
pected time of reward delivery. When the reward can be partially
predicted by the cue, the magnitude of these neurons’ phasic
activation is correlated with the difference between received
and predicted reward. These patterns of dopaminergic neuron
activity resemble prediction error signals used in temporal-differ-
ence learning. Furthermore, the basal ganglia circuits, especially
interactions between striatal and midbrain dopaminergic neu-
rons, provide the primary candidate substrate for acquisition of
such neural signals (reviewed in Joel et al., 2002).
In the context of perceptual decision making, stimulus uncer-
tainty can also give rise to prediction errors that might drive
learning. For example, for the dots task, higher coherence and/
or longer viewing times give rise to decision variables that are
more likely to produce the correct answer. For many tasks, the
correct answer leads to a reward (e.g., juice for monkeys, money
for people), whereas an error is not rewarded. Thus, in principle,
a reward prediction error can be computed by comparing the
confidence associated with the final value of the decision vari-
able with whether or not a reward was actually received at the
end of a trial. In fact, such a signal is sufficient to drive learning
on the dots task and can account for both changes in behavior
and changes in decision-related neuronal activity measured in
area LIP during training (Law and Gold, 2009).
Signals related to reward prediction errors in the context of the
dots task have recently been reported for dopaminergic neurons
in the substantia nigra pars compacta (Figure 5A). Nomoto and
colleagues (2010) used a version of dots that included manipula-
tions of both motion strength and the magnitude of reward given
for correct responses. When large rewards were expected,
dopaminergic neurons gave a phasic response just after motion
stimulus onset that was not sensitive to motion strength. In
contrast, a second phasic response around the time of saccade
onset wasmodulated positively by motion strength. After reward
feedback onset, this modulation by motion strength was
reversed, such that larger activation was associated with lower
motion strength. When an error was made, there was a brief
suppression in activity after feedback. This pattern of activity is
consistent with a reward prediction error based on the percep-
tual decision variable at the time of decision.
In principle, such a reward prediction error can be computed
continuously as the decision variable is being formed, in anticipa-
tion of the impending choice and subsequent reward. Thepredic-
tion can be computed from the signal-to-noise ratio of the
decision variable, with higher signal-to-noise ratio corresponding
to higher confidence in obtaining a reward. In the DDM, the sen-
sory evidence is assumed to be independent samples from a
Gaussian distribution. Thus, the signal is equal to the drift rate
multiplied by elapsed time, and the standard deviation (noise)
of the accumulating decision variable is proportional to the
square root of elapsed time. Figure 5B shows a simulated reward
prediction error computed this way. After motion stimulus onset,
the rewardprediction error rampsup in amanner that dependson
the strength of themotion signal but is the same for both choices.
Around the time of the saccadic response, the reward prediction
error peaks at different levels for different motion strengths and
then decays until the time of expected reward delivery. After
reward onset, the motion-strength modulation reverses signs,Neuron 79, August 21, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 645
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Figure 5. Reward Prediction Error Signals
(A) Population activity of DA neurons in a monkey performing an asymmetric-
reward task when large reward was expected. Data are plotted with respect to
onset of the visual stimulus (STIM), the saccadic response (SAC), and either
reward delivery (REW) or error feedback (FDBK). Colors indicate coherence
levels. Modified from Nomoto et al. (2010).
(B) Reward prediction error (RPE) signals derived from a DDM simulation. At
time t during motion viewing, RPE = accumulated evidence=
ﬃﬃ
t
p
. After motion
viewing, RPE decays exponentially with a time constant of 400 ms. After
feedback onset, RPE is updated with the difference between feedback value
(simulated as a positive square pulse for rewarded trials and 0 for error trials)
and the RPE value at 100 ms after feedback onset.
(C) Activity of a caudate neuron during the dots task for one choice. Data for the
other choice showed similar patterns. Modified from Ding and Gold (2010).
Neuron
Perspectivesuch that larger activation is associated with lower motion
strength. When an error is made, the reward prediction error is
suppressed after feedback.We found signals loosely conforming
to these patterns in the caudate nucleus of monkeys trained on
the RT dots task (Figure 5C; Ding and Gold, 2010). Although
caudate neurons showing the full aspects of these response
patterns were rare, subsets of these response patterns were
frequently observed in the population. Thus, these populations
may represent ongoing estimates of predicted action values in
the context of perceptual decisions.
The predicted action value may, in principle, play multiple
computational roles in decision formation. One recent study
implemented a partially observable Markov decision process
(POMDP) model to identify these roles (Rao, 2010). This model
includes: (1) a cortical component (e.g., LIP and FEF for the
dots task) that encodes a belief about the identity of noisy sen-
sory inputs; (2) highly convergent corticostriatal projections
that reduce the dimensionality of the cortical belief representa-
tion; (3) dopamine neurons that learn to evaluate the striatal
representation through temporal-difference learning; and (4) a646 Neuron 79, August 21, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.striatum-pallidal-STN network that learns to pick appropriate
actions based on the evaluation. At each time step, the model
either commits to a decision about motion direction, which
results in a large reward for correct decisions or no reward for
errors, or opts to observe the motion stimulus longer, which
takes a small effort (negative reward) for waiting. The model
initially makes random choices. Over multiple trials, the model
learns to optimize performance based on tradeoff among the
three reward outcomes, producing realistic choice and RT
behaviors. Thus, the basal ganglia may convert cortical repre-
sentations of sensory evidence into evaluative quantities, upon
which decisions can be both generated and adjusted.
Open Questions
As summarized above, there is a growing body of experimental
and theoretical support for the idea that the basal ganglia play
key, well-defined computational roles in the formation and adap-
tive modification of perceptual decisions. These roles may com-
plement and/or share common mechanisms with the basal
ganglia’s contributions to motor control and value-based deci-
sion making. However, this work is still in its infancy, especially
compared to studies of perceptual processing in sensory, pre-
frontal, and parietal cortices. Below we touch on some of the
key, open questions about the exact roles played by the basal
ganglia in perceptual decision making.
First, what is the nature of the signals that the basal ganglia
receive as input in the context of perceptual decisions? Each
component of the oculomotor network shown in Figure 2
contains a diversity of response properties related to sensory,
memory, decision, motor, and reward processing in the context
of visual-oculomotor decision tasks (for a limited sample, see
Basso and Wurtz, 1997, 2002; Bruce and Goldberg, 1985; Ding
and Gold, 2010, 2012a; Ding and Hikosaka, 2006; Freedman
and Assad, 2009; Glimcher and Sparks, 1992; Gottlieb et al.,
1998; Hanes et al., 1998; Hikosaka et al., 1989a, 1989b, 1989c;
Hikosaka and Wurtz, 1983a, 1983b; Hikosaka and Wurtz,
1983c; Horwitz and Newsome, 1999; Leon and Shadlen, 2003;
McPeek and Keller, 2002; Meister et al., 2013; Schall et al.,
1995; Thompson et al., 1996). For example, DDM-like bound
crossings are represented in LIP and FEF but not caudate,
implying that this signal is not provided as an input to the basal
ganglia (Ding and Gold, 2010, 2012a; Roitman and Shadlen,
2002). Is it represented in the output nuclei (i.e., SNr) and then
sent back to the oculomotor circuits? Likewise, do the bias-
related signals found in caudate originate there, or are they
passed from LIP and FEF? Those cortical areas represent similar
bias-related signals in the context of reward-driven saccadic
instructions (but not necessarily perceptual decisions), but it is
not knownwhether these signals are present in the subset of neu-
rons that project to the caudate (Coe et al., 2002; Ding and Gold,
2012a; Ding and Hikosaka, 2006; Ikeda and Hikosaka, 2003;
Meister et al., 2013; Platt andGlimcher, 1999;RoitmanandShad-
len, 2002; Rorie et al., 2010; Sato and Hikosaka, 2002). Charac-
terizing these kinds of input properties in detail will help to identify
the basal ganglia’s unique contributions to the decision process.
Second, what is the computational role of each basal ganglia
nucleus? Answering this question will require more complete
descriptions of perceptual decision-related signals encoded in
Neuron
Perspectivethe basal ganglia. Computational models can provide useful
startingpoints for thesestudies. For example, inBogacz andGur-
ney (2007)’s model, the average STN activity is predicted to be
proportional to the logarithm of the normalization term in Bayes’
theorem, which in themodel is used to form the decision variable
in terms of the accumulated evidence. In Rao (2010)’smodel, the
STN is partly responsible for choosing the best action based on
belief representation in the striatum, although it was not explicitly
reported what the STN firing rate would look like. A comparison
among the model predictions and actual STN activity patterns
during the dots task will help to elucidate the STN’s roles in the
decision process. Likewise, more extensive recordings from
the output nuclei of the basal ganglia, including the SNr for the
oculomotor circuit, are needed to understand how the inputs
are transformed and subsequently affect processing elsewhere.
Third, how do the basal ganglia’s roles in perceptual decision
making relate to their known functional and anatomical proper-
ties? For example, do the direct and indirect pathways play
similar, complementary roles in perceptual decision making as
they do in motor control? Are perceptual decisions processed
in their own functional loops, in loops related to the motor
context of the decision, or in more general functional loops?
The relationship between perceptual and reward-based pro-
cessing merits particular attention. One intriguing possibility is
that the same circuit contributes to both types of decisions, con-
verting sensory evidence and value expectation into a common
currency that can be used as a decision variable. One way to
answer this question is to train monkeys on a perceptual task
(e.g., the dots task) and a value-based decision task (e.g., the
asymmetric reward saccade task) and directly test whether
and how the same neurons are influenced by manipulations of
sensory properties and reward expectation. Alternatively, one
can train monkeys to perform a single task with manipulations
of both sensory properties and reward associations (Nomoto
et al., 2010; Rorie et al., 2010) and examine whether single neu-
rons respond to variations in both sensory evidence and reward
expectation, and if so, how such variations are combined in the
basal ganglia.
Lastly, why is basal ganglia dysfunction more frequently asso-
ciated with motor than with perceptual deficits? This widely
recognized clinical observation has been a pillar in motor-centric
views of the basal ganglia. Is it merely due to an observational
bias, such that motor deficits are more often expected and
tested for and therefore reported? Or does it reflect more funda-
mental differences in the time course and distribution of impair-
ment in the motor and perceptual components in the basal
ganglia? In general, a more systematic characterization of
perceptual deficits in the patient population, perhaps using tasks
equivalent to those used in monkey electrophysiology experi-
ments, would not only improve our understanding of the func-
tional organization of the basal ganglia but may also allow us
to exploit behavioral differences in the motor and perceptual
domains to improve disease diagnostic and monitoring.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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